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GIDEON'S SHELTER: THE NEED TO RECOGNIZE A
RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT DEFENDANTS
IN EVICTION PROCEEDINGS
Andrew Scherer*
I have no illusions about law and courts or the
people who are involved in them. I have read the com-
plete history of the law ever since the Romans first
started writing them down and before of the laws of
religions. I believe that each era finds a improvement
in law each year brings something new for the benefit
of mankind. Maybe this will be one of those small steps
forward.
-letter from Clarence Earl Gideon to his attorney,
Abe Fortas, November 13, 1962.1
Introduction
The young, single mother of three tearfully described how
she had returned home to her South Bronx apartment to find
the City Marshal and two helpers packing her belongings in
cardboard boxes. 2 Although she begged them to stop, one of
the assistants told her that, because the landlord had obtained
* Coordinating Attorney in Housing Law, Community Action for Legal Services,
New York, New York. J.D., New York University, 1978; B.A., University of Pennsyl-
vania, 1972.
I would like to thank the following people for their helpful comments on drafts of
this article: Oscar Chase, Jill Hamburg, Roger Maldonado, Florence Roisman, Claudia
Slovinsky, Morton Stark, Renee Steinhagen, Ellen Yaroshefsky, and Frances Werner.
Special thanks also go to Alan Jenkins, the general editor of this piece, for his encour-
agement and help and to the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review staff and
board. I also gratefully acknowledge the substantial work of a loose alliance of lay
advocates and attorneys in New York City who have made winning a right to counsel
for low-income tenants faced with eviction a priority, and whose determination will, I
am convinced, make it a reality.
I A. Lewis, Gideon's Trumpet 78 (1964).
2 The following description is based on the author's experience of nearly a decade
as a housing advocate in New York City. While fictitious, it is highly representative of
the conditions under which eviction occurs around the country.
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a court order for her eviction, there was nothing they could do.
As she and her children looked on in disbelief, the Marshal
changed the lock on the door and attached a notice stating that
the landlord had been granted possession of her apartment.
The notice, which the woman had her ten-year-old son
translate into Spanish for her, stated that she should contact the
Department of Sanitation to locate her belongings. When she
finally found her property, she was told she could not have
access to it unless she was willing to have it removed from the
warehouse. She had neither a place to store her possessions nor
the money needed to move them; she would have to leave them
there.
A few weeks earlier she had received papers from the land-
lord notifying her that he sought to evict her for nonpayment of
rent. These too were translated by her son. She called the free
legal services program but was told that they were too busy to
see her before her court date because of the lack of sufficient
staff. In court, she agreed to pay her unpaid rent. In return, the
landlord promised to inspect her apartment and make whatever
repairs were necessary. The landlord never made the repairs.
Now she found herself and her family evicted and with no place
to go.
Had this South Bronx tenant been represented by counsel,
she would have been able to assert defenses and counterclaims
in a timely and proper manner that would have, in all likelihood,
enabled her to avoid eviction. Some variation of this scene
occurs in poor communities in this country virtually every day.
In New York City alone, over 25,000 evictions take place each
year-one eviction every six minutes of the work week. 3 This
Article sets forth the argument that counsel must be provided
to indigent tenants facing eviction. Procedural due process
forms the foundation of this argument. The Article then explores
the potential statutory bases for appointment of counsel for
tenants faced with eviction and suggests additional arguments
to support the establishment of a right to counsel.4 Finally, the
New York City Department of Investigation, Statistical Analysis of Evictions
Performed by City Marshals 1 (1985).
' The arguments and theories set forth below are not intended to be exhaustive.
Statutory and constitutional provisions and common law, on the state and federal levels,
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Article discusses the issue of who can and should be appointed
as counsel and how a right to counsel could best be
implemented.
I. Eviction and the Availability of Affordable Housing
A tenant confronted with eviction, especially a low-income
tenant, now faces not only the immediate trauma and disruption
of a forced move, but also the prospect of displacement into a
housing market that no longer provides any options.: In many
parts of the country, due to the unavailability of affordable
housing, a low-income tenant has few alternatives to her present
home no matter what its condition. In our complex modern
society, shelter is negotiated as a commodity in the marketplace.
Wealth determines the quality of construction, quantity of space
and desirability of location of one's home. In recent years, a
critical shortage in the availability of affordable and habitable
housing in the United States, especially in large urban areas,
has meant that wealth can now determine one's ability to retain
a dwelling. 6 When a landlord threatens the typical tenant with
eviction she will have to defend pro se her right to a home. She
will face the landlord's lawyer in a court proceeding that in-
volves a complex web of federal, state and local laws that she
is ill-equipped to utilize.7
The only options for those who cannot afford to pay for
representation are publicly-funded legal services programs or
may provide additional arguments in support of appointment of counsel for indigent
tenants faced with eviction.
5 The diminishing affordability of housing for low-income households has been a
matter of great concern in recent years. A 1984 report of the U.S. Conference of Mayors
found that "[slince 1978, the number of households living in poverty has increased by
32%, with 1 in 7 Americans-or 34.4 million persons-now living below the poverty
line. Many of these households have been priced completely out of the private housing
market." U.S. Conference of Mayors, Housing Needs and Conditions in America's
Cities: A Survey of the Nation's Principal Cities 3 (June 1984).
6 See The Vanishing Pool of Affordable Places to Live: A Search for Solutions to
the Housing Squeeze, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1987, § 4 (Washington Review), at 5 ("Na-
tionally, low-income units have been disappearing at the rate of half a million a year,
while salaries and public assistance levels have not kept pace with housing costs. The
pressure is particularly acute in gentrified urban areas.").
' See, e.g., Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23
B.C.L. Rev. 503 (1982) (setting out the evolution of regulatory protections formally
available to tenants).
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the services of volunteer private attorneys. These options, how-
ever, are extremely limited. Indeed, at the same time that the
intensity of the housing crisis has grown, publicly-funded pro-
grams for the provision of free legal services in civil matters
have suffered debilitating budget cuts. 8 The recent growth in
volunteer programs has not sufficiently addressed the need for
more legal assistance for the poor. 9 Programs that provide free
legal services to the poor are thus only able to represent a small
fraction of those who are eligible for their services. 0
By failing to recognize a right to counsel in most civil
matters, the United States lags behind many developed western
nations. A basic assumption of the legal systems of England,
France, Switzerland and other European countries is that, for
the poor to have meaningful access to the courts, they must
have a right to representation by counsel." Indeed, a right to
appointment of counsel in civil matters under English common
law dates back to the fifteenth century. 12
8 A recent survey by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) found that 81%
of the legal services programs that responded to an ACLU questionnaire reported that
the number of attorneys in their programs had decreased as a result of budget cuts.
American Civil Liberties Union, Justice Evicted: An Inquiry into Housing Court Prob-
lems 44 (1987). An earlier ACLU report had found that grantees of the federal Legal
Services Corporation (the primary provider of free civil legal services nationally) had
lost 28% of their attorneys between 1981 and 1982. American Civil Liberties Union, No
Justice for the Poor: How Cutbacks Are Destroying Legal Services 8-9 (1983).
9 See e.g., Weinstein, The Poor's Right to Equal Access to the Courts, 13 Conn.
L. Rev. 651 (1981); and Miskiewicz, Volunteerism Alone Not Enough: Mandatory Pro
Bono Won't Disappear, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 23, 1987, at 1, 8-9.
10 See, e.g., Washington Council of Lawyers, Report on the Status of Legal Services
for the Poor 27-28 (1983) (closings and staff reductions in offices providing free legal
services have prevented many eligible tenants from obtaining legal assistance).
As the authors of one law review article observed,
At the outset, it should be recognized that England has lived with a
common law right to counsel of this dimension for four and onehalf centuries.
Germany has survived with a comprehensive statutory right since 1871, Swe-
den's similar guarantee dates from 1919, Italy's from 1923, and France's from
1851. Similarly, Switzerland's constitutional right to counsel in civil cases has
existed for over forty years.
Johnson & Schwartz, Beyond Payne: The Case for a Legally Enforceable Right to
Representation in Civil Cases for Indigent California Litigants, Part One: The Legal
Arguments, II Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 249, 258 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
12 See Statute of Henry VII, 1495, 11 Hen. 7, c. 7, 2 Statutes of the Realm 578
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Although a tenant who loses an eviction proceeding in this
country faces the possibility of homelessness, the United States
has not recognized a right to assigned counsel for indigents who
cannot otherwise obtain free legal services.
Despite the striking inequality of the eviction context, the
historical trend in other judicial contexts has been for our legal
system to develop more numerous and more effective mecha-
nisms to protect members of society from grievous loss. Prime
examples in this country include the emergence of a right to a
meaningful hearing prior to termination of government bene-
fits, 1 3 and the right to counsel for criminal defendants.14 At the
very least, the system ensures in these contexts that when loss
occurs, it is for legally valid reasons and that basic due process
has been observed.
The year 1988 marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of Gideon
v. Wainwright,15 the Supreme Court's landmark ruling guaran-
teeing the right to counsel for indigent defendants in criminal
cases. The evolution of these protections, however, has been a
slow and often uncertain process. The establishment of a broad
right to counsel for criminal defendants took forty years. In
1932, the Supreme Court found a right to counsel for defendants
in certain capital cases. 16 In 1942, however, the Court held that
"appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to
a fair trial. ' 17 In 1963, this decision was overruled and the right
to counsel was extended to serious criminal cases in Gideon. In
1972, the Court held that "no person may be imprisoned for any
(transcribed in 2 Statutes at Large 85) (repealed 1883, 46 & 47 Vict. c. 49), reprinted in
Johnson & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 253, which provided:
And after the seid writte or writtes be retorned, . . . the Justices ... shall
assigne to the same pou psone or psones Councell lerned by their discrecions
which shall geve their Councelles nothing taking for the same, and in like wise
the same Justices shall appoynte attorney and attorneyes for the same pou
psone and psones ... which shall doo their duties without any rewardes....
13 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969).
14 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Is 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
16 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
'7 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942).
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offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony,
unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." 18 Gideon held
out the promise of an important measure of fundamental fairness
when the poor encountered the judicial system. This promise
has yet to be fulfilled.
Often, the task of the legal profession is to take a need of
a client or group of clients-a perception that a particular notion
is "right" or 'just"-and articulate that need in a way that moves
the judicial apparatus. In an age characterized by diminishing
availability of housing 9 for low-income households and a
marked growth in homelessness,2 0 the need for assuring the
fairness of the eviction process has become manifest. Applica-
tion of established principles of law to the eviction context
should lead to the recognition of a right to counsel for low-
income tenants faced with eviction.
II. Legal Arguments
A. Federal Due Process Analysis
The most compelling argument for recognizing a right to
counsel for tenants faced with eviction is that, as a matter of
due process of law, a tenant should not have to defend a legal
proceeding that can result in the loss of his home without the
availability of counsel. The notion that the constitutional right
to due process of law should encompass a right to representation
by counsel when faced with the loss of something as crucial as
one's home is a notion that Americans would accept
intuitively.2'
When people of economic means are involved in any legal
dispute, the consequences of which could significantly affect
their lives, they hire lawyers to help them. Poor people do not
have that option. Yet in massive numbers, low-income people
11 Argesinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
19 See, e.g., supra notes 5-6.
20 See ittfra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
21 Indeed, a study by the National Center for State Courts found that 71% of the
public favors using tax dollars to "make good lawyers available to anyone who needs
them." National Center for State Courts, State Courts: A Blueprint for the Future 56
(1978).
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encounter the judicial system in settings which could have
equally devastating effects on their lives. The three most im-
portant of these settings are the criminal courts, where they face
a loss of liberty; the family courts, where they face a loss of
custody of their children; and the housing courts, where they
face a loss of shelter. In all jurisdictions, a right to counsel has
been established for criminal defendants ;22 in most jurisdictions,
people faced with loss of custody of their children are entitled
to appointment of counsel.23 Astonishingly, no jurisdiction to
date has clearly established a right to counsel for people faced
with eviction, even though the establishment of such a right is
consonant with the evolution of the notion of due process.
1. The Mathews Test
In Mathews v. Eldridge24 the Supreme Court set forth the
framework for determining what constitutional due process is
required when a person faces the loss of property. In Mathews
the process is required when a person faces the loss of property.
In Mathews the Court set out three distinct factors to be con-
sidered in determining the particular process due:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous depri-
vation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Govern-
ment's interest, including. . . [the] administrative bur-
dens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.25
When these factors are applied to eviction proceedings, it be-
comes clear that poor people faced with eviction should be
guaranteed the appointment of counsel.
'2 See discussion of Gideon supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
2 See, e.g., V.F. v. State, 666 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1983); In re Jacqueline H., 21 Cal.
3d 170, 178, 577 P.2d 683, 687, 145 Cal. Rptr. 548, 552 (1978); In re Ella B., 30 N.Y.2d
352, 357, 285 N.E.2d 288, 290, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133, 136 (1972).
24 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
21 Id. at 335 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71 (1969)).
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a. The Interest at Stake
A tenant faced with eviction has an enormous interest at
stake in the eviction proceeding which encompasses both a
property and a liberty interest.
(i) Property Interest
The right of a tenant to continued occupancy of his home
is a traditionally recognized property right. In Greene v. Lind-
sey,26 for example, tenants alleged that eviction judgments that
had been obtained against them by default were invalid because
they had not been given constitutionally adequate notice of the
proceedings. The Supreme Court, in the course of vindicating
the tenants' due process rights, underscored the constitutionally
protected nature of the rights at stake: "[I]n this case, appellees
have been deprived of a significant interest in property ... the
right to continued residence in their homes. '27
Obviously, trauma is likely to be associated with forced
removal from one's home. Indeed, even a voluntary move from
one residence to another is, especially for a household with
children, an enormous strain. To be forced from one's home
vastly multiplies that stress. Moreover, given the tight housing
market in many parts of the country, removal from one's home
often means removal from one's community. Social scientists
have amply documented the fact that forced dislocation from
an urban low-income or working class community is a highly
disruptive and disturbing experience.28
For low-income tenants, the trauma and disruption associ-
ated with eviction are no longer merely transitory. There is now
a significant possibility that, because of the unavailability of
-456 U.S. 444 (1982).
17 456 U.S. at 450-51. See also L. Tribe, Constitutional Law 509 (1978); Escalera
v. New York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 861 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
853 (1970).
2 For a discussion of the impact of dislocation on low-income households, see,
e.g., Critical Perspectives on Housing (R. Bratt, C. Hartman, A. Meyerson eds. 1986);
H. Gans, The Urban Villagers (1965); M. Young & P. Wilmott, Family and Kinship in
East London (1957).
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affordable housing for low-income households, 9 eviction will
result in homelessness. Thus eviction proceedings threaten not
only a tenant's ability to remain in the same dwelling or com-
munity, but often his access to any shelter at all. Due to the
low-income housing stock which is diminishing nationally at a
rate of half a million units per year 0 and the federal govern-
ment's virtual abandonment of its role in providing publicly
subsidized housing, 3' there is close to a complete absence of
housing affordable to low-income individuals in many parts of
this country.
32
29 A 1985 report by the U.S. General Accounting Office found that higher rents
disproportionately burden low-income households:
Higher rent burdens result in households paying a greater percentage of their
incomes for rent, leaving them a smaller percentage of their incomes for other
expenditures. During the period 1975-83, the number and percentage of lower-
income households with rent burdens in excess of 30 percent increased by
about 4.1 million-from 7.8 million (54 percent) in 1975 to 11.9 million (64
percent) in 1983 ... HUD often uses the figure of 30 percent or less of gross
income as a benchmark for a reasonable or affordable rent burden for a lower-
income household.
General Accounting Office, Changes in Rent Burdens and Housing Conditions of Lower
Income Households 3 (Apr. 23, 1985).
A recent study of low-income housing needs concluded that, "the less income you
have, the higher the proportion that goes for shelter." This conclusion was based on
census data from 1983 that showed, inter alia, that 18% of all renter households paid
more than 60% of their incomes for rent and utilities, and that 95% of these households
had incomes under $15,000. Dolbeare & Cushing, Low Income Housing Needs 2 (Dec.
1987).
"o See supra note 5.
31 This trend is clearly reflected by the rate of decline of public housing units
started in the years 1960-1984:
1960 44,000 1976 10,000
1965 38,000 1978 16,000
1968 38,000 1980 20,000
1970 35,000 1983 9,000
1973 12,000 1984 6,000
1975 11,000
United States Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 724 (1986).
32 The growing need for low-income housing is reflected in a number of ways and
has been amply documented by a number of sources. According to estimates made by
the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development in 1981, approxi-
mately 24 million households (29% of the total) had grossly expensive, overcrowded or
inadequate housing. Office of Policy Development and Research, U.S. Dep't of Hous.
& Urban Dev., Housing Production in 1982 and 1983 and the Stock of Housing in 1981,
Tables E-9, E-10 (Apr. 1987).
Predictably, this shortage of housing impacts disproportionately on renters, very-
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The result of this situation has been the emergence of a
low-income population with no access to housing whatsoever.
33
Although estimates of the number of homeless in the United
States vary greatly, Although estimates of the number of home-
less in the United States vary greatly, congressional findings set
forth in proposed federal legislation in 1985 stated: "[n]ot since
the Great Depression has homelessness in America reached the
epidemic proportions that it has today among major segments
of the national population. The number of homeless persons is
estimated to be as large as 3 million, and by all accounts is
increasing. '34
The interest in the continued availability of shelter is an
even more fundamental one than the interest in continued oc-
cupancy in the same residence. Thus the Supreme Court's rec-
ognition in Greene v. Lindsey35 of a property interest in the
continued residence in one's home acquires added significance
in an era in which eviction can mean homelessness.
(ii) Liberty Interest
The eviction process implicates liberty interests as well as
property interests. Liberty interests are not merely confined to
low-income households, minority group members, female-headed households and the
elderly. Id. Moreover, it has been estimated, based upon 1980 census data, that for
very-low-income households alone, a gap of 1.2 million affordable housing units exists.
Critical Perspectives on Housing, supra note 28, at xiii (1986).
Numerous studies from around the country identify eviction as a prime precipitating
cause of homelessness. See, e.g., Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Homeless in
Metro Atlanta: A Working Paper and Recommendation 5 (June 1987) (Forty-nine per-
cent of the women with children entering shelters had been evicted); Chicago Coalition
for the Homeless, Pilot Study of Homeless People 50 (1983) (Thirty-two percent of
homeless respondants reported that their homelessness was precipitated by eviction);
Melnick and Williams, Homeless in the District of Columbia, Children and Families
Without Homes: Observations From Thirty Case Studies ix (1987) (Two thirds of those
polled became homeless as a result of involuntary eviction). For similar findings, see
also, New York State Department of Social Services, Homeless in New York State: A
Report to the Governor and the Legislature 11 (Oct. 1984); Psychiatric Epidemiology
Program, School of Public Health, UCLA, Basic Shelter Research Project 50 (1985);
Task Force on the Homeless, Life in Transit, Homeless in Michigan 7 (Mar. 1986).
" In January of 1988 in New York City alone, there were over 5,155 families,
including more than 12,000 children quartered by the city in welfare hotels and shelters.
New York City Human Resources Admin., New York City Temporary Housing Program
for Families with Children 1 (Jan. 1988).
14 Homeless Americans Survival Act of 1985, at 9 (1985).
11 Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
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the right to be free from the physical restraint of one's person,
but also include:
the right of the citizen ... to use [his faculties] in all
lawful ways, to live and work where he will; to earn
his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any law-
ful trade or vocation. All laws, therefore, which impair
or trammel these rights, which limit one in his choice
of a trade or profession, or confine him to work or live
in a specified locality, or exclude him from his own
house, or restrain his otherwise lawful movements...
are infringements upon his fundamental rights of lib-
erty, which are under constitutional protection.36
The homeless who live on the streets are potentially subject to
the loss of their physical liberty through incarceration and in-
stitutionalization. 37 Even when they are not subject to physical
restraint, however, due to the perils of life on the streets,
38
homeless persons are subject to conditions that severely tram-
mel their ability to enjoy their "fundamental rights of liberty."
Because of the potential of forcible incarceration or insti-
tutionalization and because the fundamental right to enjoy lib-
erty is implicated, the liberty interests facing the homeless are
similar to the interests discussed in Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services.39 In this case, which involved termination of
parental rights, the Supreme Court adopted a presumption that
"an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when,
36 Allgeyer v. State of Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). See also Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 309, 399 (1923). Indeed, in Michelman, The Supreme Court and
Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights-Part II, 1974 Duke L.J.
527, 530 (1974), Professor Michelman notes that the right to meaningful access to the
courts is itself a liberty interest.
37 In addition to the risk of arrest and incarceration pursuant to vagrancy statutes,
the homeless may also be threatened with forced institutionalization. New York City
has in fact adopted a program to forcibly remove homeless individuals from the streets
when they are perceived to be mentally ill, or when the temperature drops below
freezing. See Boggs v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 132 A.D.2d 340, 523
N.Y.S.2d 71 (1987), where a homeless petitioner successfully challenged her institu-
tionalization on the ground that the city failed to establish that her mental condition
was likely to result in serious harm to herself or others as is required for civil
commitment.
31 See infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
39 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
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if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty. '40 Be-
cause the threat of eviction poses the threat of homelessness
and its devastating consequences, the liberty interest at stake is
one which falls within the rubric enunciated by the Court in
Lassiter.
41
To truly comprehend the interests at risk for members of
low-income households who are threatened with eviction and
homelessness, it is important to understand the potentially dev-
astating consequences of homelessness. 42 The homeless are at
much greater risk than the general population of suffering severe
medical and social problems that endure long beyond the initial
trauma of eviction. For example, the homeless are, on the
whole, more likely to be infected with a larger range of diseases
than the general population. 43 Because of the itinerant nature of
homelessness, it is difficult to control diabetes, seizures and
other chronic disabilities. 44 In addition, since the possibility of
proper diet and hygiene is diminished, a variety of additional
physical problems may arise.45
The impact of homelessness on infants and children is par-
ticularly tragic. Women living in welfare hotels are more than
twice as likely to give birth to babies with low birth weights
than is the average woman. 46 Moreover, the infant mortality rate
for babies born to these women is more than twice the national
average.
47
40 Id. at 27.
41 Even if the threat of eviction is not viewed as implicating a tenant's liberty
interest, the reasoning of Lassiter nevertheless supports the appointment of counsel for
a tenant faced with eviction. The Lassiter Court held that a presumption of a right to
counsel exists where there is a threat to a liberty interest. In the absence of such a
presumption, courts, rather than being unable to find a right to counsel, are relegated
to making determinations on a case-by-case basis.
42 It is the mere threat of these consequences that makes the interest in continued
shelter so critical. For the purpose of analyzing the interest at stake in eviction, there-
fore, it is irrelevant whether these are inevitable consequences in each individual case.
,3 Clark & Rafferty, The Sickness That Won't Heal: Health Care for the Nation's
Homeless, 16 Health Pac Bull. 21 (July-Aug. 1985).
4Id.
41 For example, a high incidence of severe malnutrition, anemia, lice infestation
and tooth decay have been documented among homeless youth. Id. at 22.
46 Id. In New York City, 18% of babies born to women in these dilapidated,
temporary dwellings had low birth weights, which is more than twice the 8.5% average
for the city as a whole. Mothers in welfare hotels had received significantly less prenatal
care than women living under "normal circumstances," and many gave birth to pre-
mature babies who had to spend weeks in expensive special care units. Id.
41 Between 1982 and 1984 the infant mortality rate in New York City's welfare
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The effects of separation from a stable community can have
long-range consequences for children. The disruption caused by
becoming homeless often creates gaps in school attendance.
Predictably, the movement of children in homeless families from
one school district to another often makes regular attendance
impossible, as do jurisdictional disputes among school districts
regarding who has responsibility for these children. 48 More fun-
damentally, homelessness often causes the break-up of families,
and results in the placement of the children in foster homes .49
While the dire consequences of homelessness for children
are perhaps more poignant, homeless persons of all ages are
severely handicapped in their ability to function as productive
members of society. They are less likely than others to be able
to vote.50 In addition, finding and holding a job is more difficult
without a permanent address. Finally, the homeless are also
much less likely to sustain relationships based on friendship,
kinship and community-relationships that provide necessary
support for one's sense of identity and well-being.
In sum, both the property and liberty interests at stake for
the low-income tenant faced with eviction are quite significant.
Such a tenant faces not only the loss of continued occupancy
of his home, but potentially, the absolute loss of shelter and the
devastating sociological consequences of homelessness.
b. Risk of Error
The risk to an unrepresented tenant of erroneous depriva-
tion of rights is inherent in the procedures used for eviction in
all jurisdictions. Throughout the development of the common
law, the relationship between landlord and tenant has become
increasingly more complex, with rights and responsibilities gov-
erned by a wide range of legal constraints.
hotels was 25 deaths before age I per 1000 births. N.Y. Times, June 10, 1986, at B3,
col. 1. The comparable national average in 1984 was 11 deaths per 1000 births. Id.
48 See, e.g., Delgado v. Freeport Pub. School Dist., 131 Misc. 2d 102, 499 N.Y.S.2d
606 (Sup. Ct. 1986); Citizens' Committee for Children of New York, 7000 Homeless
Children: The Crisis Continues 17 (Oct. 1984).
19 Office of City Council President, Children and the Housing Crisis: From No
Home to Foster Home I (Oct. 1984).
0 See, e.g., Pitts v. Black, 608 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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In the last several decades, a vast array of remedial legis-
lation has been enacted at federal, state and local levels to
enable tenants to obtain decent housing and to avoid arbitrary
treatment by the administrative and judicial system.51 Through
these new laws, legislatures have created housing and building
codes to protect the life, health and safety of tenants; 52 have
established a variety of forms of rent control, rent subsidy and
government ownership to assure the affordability of housing;
53
and have provided legislation to regulate the procedures and
grounds for eviction. 54 Mastery of, or at least familiarity with,
the relevant legislation is a prerequisite to effective defense of
an eviction proceeding.
Moreover, eviction cases involve adversarial court pro-
ceedings where rules of evidence and a host of other legal
'niceties' apply. And because eviction proceedings are generally
summary proceedings, they move much more swiftly toward
judgment than do ordinary civil cases. 55 As Justice Douglas said
1I See generally Glendon, supra note 7.
52 See, e.g., Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies, 56
B.U.L. Rev. 1, 40-49 (1976); Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory Warranties
of Habitability in Residential Leases: From Contract to Status, 16 Urb. L. Ann. 3, 10-
15 (1979).
53
Prior to 1969, rent control laws were limited in application to war-generated
"temporary housing emergencies," except in New York City where controls
have been in effect continuously since 1942. Between 1969 and 1975, rent
control legislation was adopted in Boston and several neighboring cities, over
100 New Jersey municipalities, Washington, D.C., Miami Beach, Berkeley,
and other localities .... Since 1978, rent controls have become widespread in
California.
Baar, Guidelines for Drafting Rent Control Laws: Lessons of a Decade, 35 Rutgers L.
Rev. 723, 727 (1983). For a description of federal housing programs and tenants' rights
under those programs, see National Housing Law Project, HUD Housing Programs:
Tenants' Rights: A Legal Services Practice Manual Chapter 1 (1981); National Housing
Law Project, 1985 Supplement, HUD Housing Programs: Tenants' Rights Chapter 1
(1985).
54 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 47a-23 to -42.
51 Eviction proceedings in most jurisdictions have long been governed by summary
proceeding statutes that enable landlords to obtain judgments entitling them to have
tenants evicted far more expeditiously than the ordinary course of civil legal proceed-
ings. New York's current summary eviction proceeding statute, for example, has its
origins in a statute passed in 1820 to give landlords a "simple, expeditious and inexpen-
sive means of regaining possession of [their] premises." Reich v. Cochran, 201 N.Y.
450, 454 (1911); Laws of New York, 1820, ch. 194. One commentator observed that the
state of California "enacted a comprehensive series of laws governing unlawful detainer"
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of eviction proceedings in a 1967 dissenting opinion in Williams
v. Shaffer:
Summary eviction proceedings are the order of the day.
Default judgments in eviction proceedings are obtained
in machinegun rapidity, since the indigent cannot afford
counsel to defend. Housing laws often have a built-in
bias against the poor. Slumlords have a tight hold on
the Nation.
56
The problem of housing for the poor has become far more
critical in the twenty-one years since Justice Douglas' obser-
vation.5 7 Further, issues such as the condition of the premises,
the appropriateness of the rental amount sought by the landlord
and the content and manner of service of required notices are
all legally relevant in eviction proceedings. It is not surprising
that the highest court of one state has referred to the law gov-
erning eviction proceedings as "a 'patchwork' of legislation that
has responded to decades of social, economic and political pres-
sure... an 'impenetrable thicket confusing not only to laymen
but to lawyers."'
' 58
which "reflect an ancient civil compromise" whereby the "landlord is forbidden any
form of self-help to evict a tenant, but is assured the swiftest judicial remedy possible."
Epstein, The Los Angeles Landlord-Tenant Court, 17 Urb. L. Ann. 161, 163 (1979).
Epstein further notes that litigation involving "unlawful detainer litigation has an
absolute preference on the civil calendar." He emphasizes that "when suit is filed, a
five-day summons is issued, rather than the usual thirty-day summons," thus, "a defen-
dant has only five days to answer or otherwise plead, instead of the thirty days permitted
in other civil cases." Id.
For similar pleadings in Connecticut, see Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 47a-23 to -42, cited
in Note, The Connecticut Housing Court: An Initial Evaluation, 12 Conn. L. Rev. 296,
297 (1980). In Connecticut, as elsewhere, summary process eviction statutes are strictly
construed. Id. at 301.
56 Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037, 1040 (1967), denying cert. to 222 Ga. 334,
149 S.E.2d 668 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
" See supra notes 5-6.
58 La Guardia v. Cavanaugh, 53 N.Y.2d 67, 70, 423 N.E.2d 9, 10, 440 N.Y.S.2d
586, 587, (1981) (quoting In re 89 Christopher, Inc. v. Joy, 35 N.Y.2d 213, 220, 318
N.E.2d 776, 780, 360 N.Y.S.2d 612, 618 (1974)). Eviction proceedings are based on a
complex interplay of procedural and substantive rights in most jurisdictions. A 1981
report prepared by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
and the American Bar Association notes that:
not long ago, evictions tended to be truly "summary." A landlord needed only
to have alleged nonpayment of rent and, barring any technical defects in his
or her pleadings, would have won a judgment for possession almost automat-
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While most landlords are represented by counsel in eviction
proceedings, most low-income tenants are unable to obtain
counsel and appear pro se. 59 Indeed, funding for programs which
provide legal services to the poor has decreased in recent
years. 60 While there is an "underlying assumption of the adver-
sarial system ... that both parties have roughly equal legal
resources... [t]his assumption is destroyed when only one side
is represented."
'61
The technical and complex nature of the proceedings, cou-
pled with adequate legal representation for the landlord, leaves
the unrepresented indigent tenant severely disadvantaged in her
ability to defend an eviction case. While a wide range of de-
fenses are now typically available to tenants faced with eviction,
because the unrepresented tenant lacks the requisite knowledge
and expertise, she is generally unable to take advantage of
them.62
ically. Recent laws enacted by legislatures, and in other instances interpreted
into case law by the courts, have made legal issues far more complex. The
idea of mutually dependent covenants-that the tenant must pay his or her
rent and the landlord must maintain the premises in habitable condition-is
only one illustration of major changes affecting tenancy relationships.
U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. & American Bar Ass'n, Executive Summary,
Specialized Courts: Housing Justice in the United States 16 (Jan. 1981).
19 A national survey which sought estimates from attorneys who work in federally
funded legal services programs in 1987 found that the vast majority of tenants appear
without representation in eviction cases. American Civil Liberties Union, Justice
Evicted, supra note 8, at 42. See also The City Wide Task Force on Housing Court, 5
Minute Justice or "Ain't Nothing Going on But the Rent!" 34 (Nov. 1986) (only 20.8%
of all tenants in New York City's Housing Courts were represented). Birnbaum, Collins
& Fusco, Chicago's Eviction Court: A Tenants' Court of No Resort, 17 Urb. L. Ann.
93, 114-15 (1979) (citing J. Birnbaum, N. Collins, A. Fusco, Jr., Judgment Landlord: A
Study of Eviction Court in Chicago (1978)) (approximately 7% of all tenants were
represented).
60 From 1981 to 1987, funding for the federal Legal Services Corporation declined
5%, from $321.3 million to $305 million. During that same period, salaries and other
costs increased, with a net result that nearly 30% of the casehandling staff was lost.
American Civil Liberties Union, Justice Evicted. supra note 8, at 44 (1987).
61 Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761, 764 n.3 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing Bounds v. Smith,
430 U.S. 817, 826 (1977)), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983).
62 One writer commenting on the Detroit Housing Court found that it was nearly
impossible for unrepresented tenants to comprehend and thus meaningfully raise appro-
priate defenses in eviction cases, with the result that, "[iun short, many people view
landlord-tenant court as an 'eviction mill,' providing neither careful consideration of
each case nor an aggressive approach to code enforcement." Reed, Detroit Code En-
forceinent and the Housing Court Debate, 17 Urb. L. Ann. 215, 219 (1979) (footnote
omitted).
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Additionally, the physical settings and procedural
circumstances in which eviction cases are litigated
often contribute to the inability of unrepresented ten-
ants to defend themselves adequately: Heavy case-
loads tend to breed (a) time pressures that intimidate
defendants; (b) judicial failure to determine whether
inarticulated defenses exist; (c) cursory examination of
plaintiffs' proofs whereby plaintiffs win in spite of fa-
tally defective proof; (d) timesaving procedures that
may violate individuals' rights to a fair hearing;
(e) pressure on defendants in landlord-tenant cases to
settle in the hall resulting in imbalanced, unsupervised
settlements .63
One judge who spent time observing housing courts around
the country concluded that if "fairness, effectiveness, and sen-
sitivity are equated with justice, then injustice is the norm."
64
The judge found that litigants were both "ignorant and unin-
formed of their procedural and substantive rights and respon-
sibilities [and that] they did not comprehend the litigation pro-
cess." 65 While many "cases were summarily disposed of rather
than adjudicated ... [e]ven when adjudications were fairly and
sensitively made, the results obtained did not respond effec-
tively to the needs of the litigants. '66 Thus, due to the tenant's
lack of legal sophistication and the unwillingness of the legal
system to protect the unrepresented tenant's rights, the risk of
an erroneous or unfair determination is enormous for the tenant
defending himself in an eviction action.
Representation by counsel makes a tremendous, and in
many cases determinative, difference. 67 Attorneys are generally
63 Scott, Housing Courts and Housing Justice: an Overview, 17 Urb. L. Ann. 3,
6-7 (1979) (footnotes omitted). The author observed that even "more extreme problems
reportedly occur in some jurisdictions in terms of courtroom behavior and decorum."
Id.
, Garrity, The Boston Housing Court: An Encouraging Response to Complex
Issues, 17 Urb. L. Ann. 15, 24 (1979).
65Id.
66Id.
67 The Chicago Eviction Court Study established that "[o]utcomes were markedly
different, however, between tenants represented by an attorney and tenants who did
not retain counsel." Birnbaum, Collins & Fusco, supra note 59, at 114.
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familiar with the procedural requirements for maintenance of
eviction proceedings, and with substantive legal protections
such as warranty of habitability, warranty of quiet enjoyment,
retaliatory eviction and constructive eviction. They are aware
of the legal and equitable defenses available to the tenant in an
eviction proceeding such as waiver, laches, lack of personal
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Most importantly, they
are familiar with court procedures-motion practice, calendar-
ing of cases, trial practice, and rules of evidence.
In contrast, since the unrepresented tenant does not have
access to this information she cannot use it to her advantage.
As the Supreme Court noted in Goldberg v. Kelly,68 the "op-
portunity" to be heard is deficient if it is not "tailored to the
capacity and circumstances of those who are to be heard." 69 As
the eviction process fails to accommodate the special needs and
characteristics of the indigent tenant population, it is fatally
deficient. Most tenants faced with eviction are in no position to
become familiar with court proceedings. Thus, the results of
these uneven proceedings necessarily reflect the inequality
caused by the tenant's lack of counsel. As a report on New
York City's Housing Court concluded:
In a process that happens so quickly that many
tenants are left wondering if the case is actually over
or not; when most tenants have no legal training and
are confronted with documents full of legal jargon;
when the landlords' attorneys are so at home in the
court that they appear to tenants to be court personnel;
... and when the person writing up the agreement
they are expected to sign is the adversary; can justice
be found?
70
In Powell v. Alabama,71 the Supreme Court stated that "Itihe
right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. '72 The Court
- 397 U.S. 254 (1969).
69 Id. at 268-69 (footnote omitted).
7 0 The City Wide Task Force on Housing Court, supra note 59, at 91.
71 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
72 Id. at 68-69.
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recognized that "[e]ven the intelligent and educated layman has
small and sometimes no skill in the science of law."'73 As Powell
specifically addressed the rights of defendants in criminal cases,
the Court found that "[i]f charged with crime, [a defendant] is
incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the
indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence." 74 The Court emphasized the need for an attorney
because "[I]eft without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evi-
dence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmis-
sible." 75 Since the defendant lacks
both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his
defense, even though he may have a perfect one[,] [h]e
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be
not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because
he does not know how to establish his innocence.
76
While the consequences of the proceedings differ, the un-
represented tenant faced with eviction is no less handicapped
than the unrepresented defendant in a criminal proceeding. De-
spite the availability of procedural protections, affirmative de-
fenses, or counterclaims, these protections are "virtually mean-
ingless for the tenant being evicted without benefit of counsel.
77
In Lassiter, the Court found that the presence of counsel
could not have made a determinative difference because of
the informality of the proceeding, the overwhelming evidence
against the defendant, and the defendant's exhibited lack of
interest in the proceeding. 7 Most eviction proceedings, on the




77 F. Werner, Toward a Right to Counsel for Indigent Tenants in Eviction Proceed-
ings, 17 Housing L. Bull. 65 (Sept./Oct. 1987). Werner reports the "revolutionary"
developments in tenancy law such as the increased willingness to view residential leases
as contracts with "mutually dependent covenants that condition the obligation to pay
rent upon the delivery and maintenance of habitable premises," and new regulatory
controls on demolition, condominium conversions and rent increases which often require
just cause for eviction. Id.
18 452 U.S. at 33 (1981).
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other hand, are litigated in formal courts of law, where rules of
evidence and a variety of technical procedural requirements
apply. Moreover, most poor tenants facing eviction have a va-
riety of defenses available to them and a strong desire to assert
those defenses and retain their homes. In sum, the risk of error
in an eviction is great. This risk, however, can be substantially
reduced though representation by counsel.
c. The Government's Interest
In evaluating the governmental interest in the appointment
of counsel for indigent defendants in eviction proceedings, sev-
eral factors must be considered. These include the government's
interest in the administration of justice, the just and equitable
distribution of finite financial resources, and its interest in the
health, safety and welfare of its citizens. Viewed in light of each
of these factors, a right to counsel in such proceedings would
benefit both the government and the tenant.
The government shares the defendant's interest in the fair
resolution of litigation in which eviction is sought. The primary
purpose of procedural protections in our judicial system is to
ensure the fairness and the accuracy of judicial determinations. 79
The Supreme Court in Lassiter noted that "the state's interest
... may perhaps best be served by a hearing in which both
[parties] are represented by counsel," since an equal contest is
most likely to lead to accurate and just results. 8°
The overarching public interest in assuring decent housing
for low-income people has made this an area of heightened local,
state, federal, and even international concern'.8 Thus, apart
79 See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (the state always has a substantial
interest in the fairness and accuracy of its own adjudications); Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
90 452 U.S. at 28.
81 The National Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1401, set forth the national goal
of "a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family..."
- a goal later to be affirmed in the Housing Act of 1947, 42 U.S.C. § 1441. Indeed, the
fundamental need for shelter is often viewed in terms of human rights as well. "Everyone
has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself
and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary
social services,'and the right to security ... in circumstances beyond his control."
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25(1) (1948), reprinted in P. Sieghart, The
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from a general interest in the fairness of its dispute resolution
mechanisms, the government has a particular interest in the fair
adjudication of claims regarding housing.
Because eviction, displacement and homelessness all ad-
versely affect the health, safety and welfare of their victims and
thereby frustrate the government's mandate to provide for the
general welfare, the government likewise shares an interest in
the effects that homelessness has on tenants. Moreover, the
existence of a permanent class of people that is without shelter
can potentially have a long-range impact on the quality of life
in the society at large. Children reared in public shelters and
welfare hotels daily confront drug and alcohol abuse, prostitu-
tion, and other deleterious conditions. In addition they are
poorly educated and isolated from stable communities. Thus a
generation of children will mature with a slim chance of growing
up to become productive members of society.
82
Finally, the government's interest in the appointment of
counsel involves two competing fiscal concerns. If the govern-
ment were required to pay for counsel83 it would have an obvious
concern with that cost. But, even if that expense were high, and
not offset by commensurate savings, cost alone should not deter
the government from vindicating important legal rights. In dis-
cussing the proposed defunding of the Legal Services Corpo-
ration, the Chief Judge of the United States District Court of
the Eastern District of New York rejected the notion that "in
times of inflation, constitutional rights go by the boards," or
that our "concept of equality" should be "inversely linked to
the prime rate. ' 84 Finally, the Judge, quoting Justice Learned
Hand, stated: "If we are to keep our democracy there must be
one commandment: thou shall not ration justice. '8 5
International Law of Human Rights at 193 (1983). See also International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11(1) (1966), reprinted in id. at 193 ("The
States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions."). For a discussion
of the binding effect of the declaration on member states of the United Nations, see id.
at 53-55.
' See generally J. Kozol, Rachel and Her Children (1988) for an in-depth discussion
of the condition of life for families in homeless shelters and welfare hotels.
83 As discussed below, infra pp. 589-90, because of the available option of man-
datory and uncompensated appointments, this may not be necessary.
84 Weinstein, Equal Access to the Courts, supra note 9, at 657.
85 Id.
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Moreover, as the government has long been deeply involved
in the subsidization of legal costs for corporations and affluent
individuals, 86 the inequality of "rationing" justice for the poor is
even more disturbing. Under sections 162 and 212 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 for example, legal fees, other than those
which are incurred for personal reasons (such as perfection of
title to property), or which must be capitalized, are generally
deductible by the taxpayer in computing taxable income.87 For
individuals in the highest tax bracket, the government subsidy
for deductible legal fees is seventy percent of the fee.88
In any event, balanced against the cost of making counsel
available must be the heavy governmental costs associated with
eviction and homelessness. Although every low-income house-
hold that is evicted will not necessarily become homeless and
in need of temporary shelter at government expense, the pros-
pect of significant numbers of households encountering such a
fate is daunting. The costs of homelessness to the public purse
have become staggering. In New York City alone, the public
cost of providing temporary shelter and related services to the
homeless was estimated at over $125 million in 1987.89 Annual
16 For corporations in the highest tax bracket (all corporations with taxable income
exceeding $100,000), almost half of the corporation's deductible legal fees are in effect
paid by the government.
Legal fees incurred in connection with a taxpayer's trade or business are generally
deductible under section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, and
these fees may be deducted regardless of whether the taxpayer itemized deductions. In
addition, some legal expenses incurred in connection with the production of income,
but not incurred in connection with a trade or business, are deductible under section
212(1) or (2) of the Code by individuals who itemize their deductions.
Some examples of deductible legal fees include:
1. Fees incurred by a corporation named as a defendant in a divorce proceeding
between a shareholder and his wife, Dolese v. United States, 605 F.2d 1146 (10th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980);
2. Fees incurred by an underwriter in the unsuccessful defense of a criminal pros-
ecution for fraud under the securities law, Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966);
3. Fees incurred by a corporation in defending and settling a tort claim arising out
of the negligent use of a company-owned car, Kopp's Co. v. United States, 80-2 T.C.
9747 (4th Cir. 1980);
4. Fees incurred in applying for a federal income tax ruling, Rev. Rul. 67-401, 1967-
2 C.B. 123; Kaufmann v. United States, 227 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Mo. 1963);
5. Fees incurred by a taxpayer in defending criminal prosecution for tax fraud,
even if convicted, Rev. Rul. 68-662, 1968-2 C.B. 69.
I.R.C. §§ 162, 212 (1954).
83 Id.
89 Committee on Legal Assistance of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, Report on the Prevention of Homelessness By Providing Legal Representation
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maintenance of a family of four in a New York City welfare
hotel can cost up to $25,00090 and the average length of stay for
these families is thirteen months. 9' Indeed, to the extent that
provision of counsel could avert the homelessness of even a
small portion of those represented, expenditure for that purpose
could be highly cost-effective. A report of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York concluded that: "The prelimi-
nary data in New York City indicates that the costs of providing
legal services to the poor [to defend against evictions] is more
than offset by savings in expenditures that would otherwise have
to be made to shelter individuals and families made homeless
by wrongful eviction.
92
2. Access to Court
In addition to the three-tiered Mathews test, another frame-
work for analyzing the process due the low-income litigant faced
with eviction from her home is provided by a line of cases which
addresses the right of poor persons to meaningful access to the
courts.
to Tenants Faced With Eviction Proceedings 2 (Dec. 3, 1987). Other localities have
encountered similar costs. See, e.g., Task Force for the Homeless, Homelessness in
Metropolitan Atlanta 2 (June 1987) (the city of Atlanta spends in excess of $650,000
annually on shelters and other services for the homeless). See also Executive Office of
Human Services, Homeless Families in Massachusetts 5 (Jan. 1987) (housing services
for the homeless and staffing for preventative programs in Massachusetts totalled over
$1 million in fiscal year 1987). Moreover, the federal government recently appropriated
$400 million to address the problem of homelessness. Stewart B. McKinney Homeless
Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-77, 1987 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News (101 Stat.)
482.
go New York City Human Resources Administration, Advisory Task Force Report
on the Homeless, Toward a Comprehensive Policy on Homelessness (Feb. 24, 1987).
In Los Angeles, $13,870,749 was spent on shelter for the homeless in 1986. Shelter
Partnership, Inc., The Short-Term Housing System of Los Angeles County: Serving
the Housing Needs of the Homeless: An Analysis of Operating Characteristics and
Funding Activity 9 (1987).
9' New York City Human Resources Administration, New York City Temporary
Housing Program for Families with Children 7 (May 1986).
" Committee on Legal Assistance of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, Report on the Prevention of Homelessness By Providing Legal Representation
to Tenants Faced With Eviction Proceedings 23 (Dec. 3, 1987). In recognition of the
connection between eviction and homelessness, New York City's Department of Social
Services funded pilot projects in fiscal year 1987-88 to provide legal assistance to low-
income tenants at risk of eviction or recently evicted. In his proposed budget for 1989,
Governor Cuomo of New York State has allocated several million dollars for such
programs.
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In Boddie v. Connecticut,93 the Supreme Court held that an
indigent person could not be barred from filing for divorce be-
cause of his inability to pay a filing fee. The principle articulated
in Boddie rests on the fundamental argument that no person
should be denied access to civil courts because he cannot afford
to pay a fee, finance a bond, risk a penalty or hire an attorney.
The Court stressed that "[p]ersons forced to settle their claims
of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a
meaningful opportunity to be heard. '94 This notion is an integral
aspect of the right to procedural due process. 95
The fact that the dissolution of marriage could only be
accomplished through the courts was a pivotal issue in Boddie.96
Similarly, the indigent tenant who is a defendant in an eviction
proceeding has no extra-judicial recourse available to her. In
most jurisdictions, severance of the landlord-tenant relationship
can only be accomplished through adjudication.97 In addition to
the requirement that the litigant be forced to rely on the courts,
the interest at stake must be of basic importance before poor
persons will have a constitutional right to court access without
charge.
Thus, in United States v. Kras,98 the Supreme Court held
that an indigent individual was not entitled to waiver of a filing
fee for a bankruptcy petition because the ability to declare
bankruptcy was not as important as divorce, nor was bank-
ruptcy the petitioner's sole recourse for protection against cred-
93 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
14 Id. at 377. See also Michelman, supra note 36, at 530.
9S See Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 955-56 (1971) (Black, J.,
dissenting), denying cert., 225 Ga. 91, 166 S.E.2d 88. In his dissent, Justice Black stated
that "Boddie cannot and should not be limited to either its facts or its language." He
argued that "there can be no doubt that this country can afford to provide court costs
and lawyers to Americans who are now barred by their poverty from resort to the law
for resolution of their disputes." Id. at 956.
% 401 U.S. at 377.
97 See, e.g., Kassan v.*Stout, 9 Cal. 3d 39, 507 P.2d 87, 106 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1973)
(although a tenant's attempted assignment of his lease constituted a violation thereof,
the landlord was not authorized to forcibly evict the tenant, or his assignee, but was
required to seek assistance from the courts, and, having failed to do so, was liable to
the tenant in a forcible entry and detainer action); Annotation, Right of Landlord Legally
Entitled to Possession to Dispossess Tenant Without Legal Process, 6 A.L.R.3d 177
(1966) (landlord may be subject to criminal liability or civil sanctions under state law
for reentering leased premises by force or a breach of the peace).
98 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
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itors. In contrast, in the eviction context, it cannot be said that
the interest at stake is any less than that of someone seeking
divorce. Indeed, as discussed above,99 the interest at stake for
the tenant faced with eviction is quite substantial.
Cases involving the rights of prisoners to legal assistance
are illustrative of the Supreme Court's willingness to remove
barriers to legal participation. The Court has held that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that pris-
oners be given free and full access to the courts. 100 In Procunier
v. Martinez,'0' the Supreme Court invalidated an administrative
regulation that barred prisoners' access to the assistance of law
students and paralegals, holding that such regulations were in-
consistent with the due process right of access to the courts.
Further, in Bounds v. Smith, 0 2 the Court held that a prisoner's
right to meaningful access to the courts required the provision
of legal assistance in the preparation of habeas corpus and other
writ petitions, where prisoners did not have access to adequate
law libraries.
In the context of eviction proceedings, for access to the
courts to be meaningful, the defendant must have an opportunity
to be represented by counsel. As one commentary on the right
to counsel in civil proceedings concludes: "The right to bring or
defend a lawsuit without an accompanying right of counsel is,
in most cases, hollow. A realistic court could not long reconcile
granting a right of access to the courts with denial of the rights
which make access effective."' 13
3. Government as Landlord
While Mathews and the cases which delineate the require-
ments of meaningful access to the courts present the framework
99 See supra pp. 39-41.
100 See, e.g., Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S.
483 (1969).
101 4 6 U.S. 396, 419 (1974).
1- 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).
103 Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 Yale L.J. 545, 559
(1967).
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for a due process right to assigned counsel in the eviction con-
text, that right becomes imperative when a governmental entity
threatens to evict a tenant. In situations where the government
acts as landlord, or where there is substantial government in-
volvement in the administration of housing, the significance of
the fourteenth amendment's mandate that no state shall deprive
an individual of due process of law is particularly evident. The
government has a dual role in the deprivation of property in
such instances as the state is both the entity seeking the property
and the entity adjudicating the dispute over the property. Be-
cause the government is both the plaintiff and the arbiter, de-
fendants who are evicted by the state for the benefit of the state
have a particularly strong claim that they have been denied due
process of law.
While claims to continued occupancy and shelter are im-
portant property interests, the tenant in housing provided or
subsidized by the government has an additional interest in re-
taining the benefits of the government program. 104 Most govern-
ment-run or subsidized housing programs provide benefits, most
notably affordability, that are simply not provided by the private
sector. Such housing is also generally filled to such a capacity
that, once evicted, a tenant has a slim chance of finding similar
replacement housing. 0 5 To the extent that the Mathews test
involves a balancing of the competing interests, the individual's
interest becomes more significant in light of the twin role of
government. 106
10 See, e.g., Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 675 F.2d 1342, 1345-46 (6th Cir.
1982) (recognizing legitimate expectation of eviction only with good cause); Escalera v.
New York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.) (identifying statutorily supported
property interest in retaining government owned housing), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853
(1970). See also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) ("The
inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the
challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the actor may be fairly
treated as that of the State itself.").
101 A recent report by the United States Conference of Mayors found that 65% of
the cities surveyed had closed their waiting lists for various forms of assistance housing
due to their extensive length. Chicago reported a 10-year waiting list for such housing
while Washington, D.C. reported an 8-year waiting list. None of the cities that were
surveyed expected to meet the housing needs of low-income households in the forseeable
future. United States Conference of Mayors, The Continuing Growth of Hunger, Home-
lessness and Poverty in America's Cities: 1987, A 26-City Survey 43 (1987).
10 See Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733, 769 (1964)
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B. State Due Process
Most state constitutions have due process clauses. 0 7 Fur-
ther, in many states it has been held that the rights enforceable
under such clauses are not coterminous with the rights recog-
nized under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 08 Indeed, many states have determined that their due
process clauses afford substantially greater protections than
those afforded by the federal Constitution. 09Rather than ex-
ploring the diverse application of the due process clauses of the
various state constitutions, this Section will present various
arguments that may prove successful in establishing a right to
counsel on state constitutional grounds.
State courts are free to formulate their own analyses of the
states' constitutional requirements of due process and are not
constrained by the analyses used by the federal judiciary." 0
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Lassiter suggested that "wise
public policy ... may require that higher standards be adopted
[by the states] than those minimally tolerable under the [federal]
constitution.""'
Although the due process rights of tenants faced with evic-
tion have not been addressed in state cases which have differ-
entiated state due process rights from federal rights, state courts
have found a greater right to due process under state constitu-
tions in other contexts. Family law is one area in which states
have taken a more expansive view of their due process clauses.
For example, the due process clause of the Alaska constitution
"I See, e.g., Miss. Const. art. 3, § 14; Nev. Const. art. 1, § 8.
108 See generally Note, The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv.
L. Rev. 1324 (1982).
109 See generally The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 959
(1985). See also Note, supra note 108.
110 It has been widely noted that the Supreme Court has, in the last decade, sub-
stantially shifted the focus of constitutional doctrine away from the dependence on
federal law and federal courts characterized by the Warren Court, and toward increased
reliance upon state law and state courts. See, e.g., Brennan, State Constitutions and
the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 502-03 (1977); Ratner, A
New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 Tex.
L. Rev. 777, 814 (1985); Rosenfeld, The Place of State Courts in the Era of Younger v.
Harris, 59 B.U.L. Rev. 597, 603 (1979).
"1 452 U.S. at 33.
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has been interpreted to require appointment of counsel for an
indigent parent faced with termination of parental rights.1 2 Like-
wise, the due process clause of the Michigan constitution has
been interpreted to require appointment of counsel for an indi-
gent putative father in a paternity suit.1 3
Criminal law is another area in which states have more
broadly interpreted due process rights than has the federal ju-
diciary. In the area of search and seizure, for example, the
Supreme Court has held that standing to seek the supression of
evidence obtained during an illegal search is limited to the sub-
ject of the search." 4 The Supreme Court of Louisiana, in con-
trast, has held that any potentially aggrieved party has standing
to seek to exclude illegally obtained evidence." 5 Likewise, the
Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel for criminal
defendants does not extend to persons asked to participate in
lineups prior to the formal "initiation of adversary judicial pro-
ceedings." ' 6 The California Supreme Court, in contrast, has
upheld the right to counsel at preindictment lineups.1 7
Since state courts have independently interpreted the right
to due process under state constitutions, even if federal courts
fail to recognize the right to counsel based on federal constitu-
tional grounds, an indigent tenant faced with eviction may be
entitled to appointment of counsel on state constitutional
grounds.
C. Poor Persons Statutes
As early as 1494, English law authorized the appointment
of counsel to represent poor persons without charge." 8 In 1917,
the California Supreme Court ruled that indigent California lit-
"' See V.F. v. State, 666 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1983); Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893
(Alaska 1979). Other state constitutions have been similarly interpreted to support a
right to counsel for a parent faced with termination of parental rights. See, e.g., In re
Ella B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 357, 285 N.E.2d 288, 290, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133, 136 (1972).
"3 See Artibee v. Cheboygan Circuit Judge, 397 Mich. 54, 243 N.W.2d 248 (1976).
114 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1969).
"1. State v. Culotta, 343 So. 2d 977, 981-82 (La. 1976). The Louisiana Supreme
Court relied on the specific language of the Louisiana Constitution.
116 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
117 People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 97-102, 634 P.2d 927, 932-35, 177 Cal.
Rptr. 576, 581-84 (1981).
118 See supra note 11.
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igants were entitled to the same in forma pauperis rights that
were conferred in early English law. 119 The court quoted Black-
stone's Commentaries: "And paupers.., are, by statute (Stats.
11 Hen. VII, c. 12), to have original writs and subpoenas gratis,
and counsel and attorney assigned them without fee; and are
excused from paying costs .... 120
The direct descendants of this early English law are the
federal and state "poor persons" statutes. Many states have
poor persons statutes that authorize the appointment of counsel
in civil matters for people who cannot afford the costs of pros-
ecuting or defending a proceeding.121 Although the language of
most of these provisions makes the appointment of counsel
discretionary, a strong argument can be made that, because of
the interests at risk, it would be an abuse of discretion to refuse
119 Martin v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 289, 168 P. 135 (1917).
120 176 Cal. at 294, 168 P. at 137.
121 Examples of state poor persons statutes that authorize the appointment of coun-
sel include:
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, 5-105 (Smith-Hurd 1983):
Poor Person. If any court shall, before or after the commencement of an
action, be satisfied that the plaintiff or defendant is a poor person, and unable
to prosecute or defend the action and pay the costs and expenses thereof...
[tihe court may assign to such person counsel, who, as well as all other officers
of the court, shall perform their duties in such action without any fees, charge
or reward.
Ind. Code Ann. § 34-1-1-3 (Burns 1986):
Attorney for poor person-Any poor person not having sufficient means
to prosecute or defend an action may apply to the court ... for leave to
prosecute or defend as a poor person. The court, if satisfied that such person
has not sufficient means to prosecute or defend ... shall assign him an attorney
to defend or prosecute the cause. ...
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 1102(a) (McKinney 1978):
the court in its order permitting a poor person to proceed as a poor person
may assign an attorney.
Va. Code Ann. § 14.1-183 (Supp. 1987):
Persons allowed services without fees or costs.-Any person ... who, on
account of his poverty is unable to pay fees or costs may be allowed by a court
to sue or defend a suit therein without paying fees or costs; whereupon he
shall have, from any counsel whom the court may assign him ... all needful
services and process, without any fees to them therefor...
Over half of the states and the District of Columbia have statutes authorizing the
appointment of counsel. See Note, Indigents' Right to Appointed Counsel in Civil
Litigation, 66 Geo. L.J. 113 n.16 (1977).
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to appoint counsel for an indigent tenant who is forced to defend
a summary eviction proceeding.
Jurisdictions have adopted varying standards to determine
when the right to appointment of counsel under poor persons
statutes attaches. 22 However, in most jurisdictions, there is not
extensive case law addressing this issue. Thus, the task of a
court when faced with a motion for appointment of counsel
under a state poor persons statute is to determine whether ap-
pointment of counsel is appropriate under the circumstances.
The federal analogue to the state poor persons statutes is
28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1982).123 In Merritt v. Faulkner,2 4 the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals reiterated a useful, widely followed
standard for determining an indigent's entitlement to appoint-
ment of counsel. In examining the request, courts should
consider
(1) whether the merits of the indigent's claim are col-
orable; (2) the ability of the indigent plaintiff to inves-
tigate crucial facts; (3) whether the nature of the evi-
dence indicates that the truth will more likely be
exposed where both sides are represented by counsel;
(4) the capability of the indigent litigant to present the
case; and (5) the complexity of the legal issues raised
by the complaint. 2 5
The indigent tenant faced with eviction will generally be
able to satisfy these criteria. Most indigent defendants have at
least colorable defenses to a claim for their eviction. Often,
" For example, under New York's poor person statute, where (1) indigent status
is not disputed (or is beyond doubt), (2) prima facie merit of the claim or defense is
indicated, and (3) counsel from federally-funded or other free legal services organiza-
tions is unavailable, failure to assign counsel under § 1101(a) is an abuse of discretion.
Yearwood v. Yearwood, 54 A.D.2d 626, 387 N.Y.S.2d 433 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
M' Section 1915(d) provides in pertinent part that, "[tihe court may request an
attorney to represent any such person unable to employ counsel." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)
(1982).
124 697 F.2d 761 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983).
12-1 Id. at 764 (citing Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 887-89 (7th Cir. 1981)). The
Maclin factors, although they are not exclusive, have been generally followed in other
circuits. See Hodge v. Police Officers; Colon #623 and Repuerto, #145, 802 F.2d 58,
61 (2d Cir. 1986); Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1984); Ulmer v. Chancellor,
691 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1982).
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because of the generally deficient quality of the housing inhab-
ited by poor people, at least in jurisdictions where a warranty
of habitability has been established, many poor people will be
able to raise the conditions of the premises as a defense to a
threatened eviction.
12 6
Proving defenses in an eviction action may require the use
of discovery devices such as the subpoena of various witnesses
and documents. Yet it is beyond the ability of most indigent
defendants to use these devices to investigate crucial facts and
thus to defend adequately against eviction. Eviction proceedings
often involve sharp factual disputes such as whether the ceiling
leaks or whether rent was paid. Accurately resolving the dis-
putes presented to the court is virtually impossible when one
party is represented and the other is not. In addition, in pro-
ceedings which involve procedural mechanisms such as rules of
evidence and motion practice, indigent tenants are often incap-
able of adequately presenting their cases. Finally, as discussed
earlier, 27 modern eviction proceedings can be remarkably com-
plex, involving the interplay of a wide variety of local, state and
federal law.
Because tenants in eviction proceedings are typically un-
able to retain counsel while landlords are almost always repre-
sented, a compelling argument may be made that appointment
of counsel is warranted under general poor persons statutes.
Although this approach has yet to be adequately tested in the
state courts, such statutes represent a promising area for further
exploration in the jurisdictions in which they exist. 128
126 In a New York program to provide representation to low-income tenants in
eviction proceedings, "[e]very case achieved some or all the tenant's objectives....
This was accomplished in many cases when the volunteer attorney asserted the land-
lord's breach of its warranty to maintain the apartment in a habitable condition." The
availability of such defenses is common among indigent tenants but they are rarely
asserted absent competent counsel. Moynihan, Selected Sections of a Narrative Report
on the Brooklyn Family Anti-Eviction Project 2 (Mar. 1988).
127 See supra text accompanying note 58.
'2 Careful scrutiny of the context in which eviction proceedings take place may
reveal additional bases upon which a right to counsel could be established. For example,
while the federal judiciary has explicitly declined to evoke "strict scrutiny" regarding
economic distinctions in the law, San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 24 (1973) ("At least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does
not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages."), the California Supreme
Court has recognized wealth as a suspect classification for equal protection purposes.
Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert. denied,
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III. Application of a Right to Appointed Counsel
Ideally, application of the Mathews test or some compara-
ble analysis will result in the establishment of a right to counsel
for all tenants faced with eviction. Such a result would be war-
ranted based on the common characteristics of all eviction pro-
ceedings, i.e., the magnitude of the interest at stake for the
tenant, the risk of error in the absence of counsel and the
government's interest in a fair adjudication and the ability of
low-income people to retain their homes.
Realistically, it is possible that initially an across-the-board
approach may meet with judicial resistance. If, for example,
courts choose to extend Lassiter's presumption against the ap-
pointment of counsel to the eviction context, an individualized
or case-by-case approach may prove more acceptable. It is thus
worth examining some of the variables that a court should con-
sider in a case-by-case approach to analyzing the right to ap-
pointment of counsel in the eviction context.
One such variable is the statutory and case law of the
jurisdiction. Paradoxically, in jurisdictions with more procedural
and substantive protections for tenants, the risk of error for a
tenant who appears unrepresented is much greater than in juris-
dictions with fewer rights. Another variable is the defendant's
ability to represent her own interests effectively. Defendants
who have difficulty speaking English, who are disabled or el-
derly, or who have a limited education may be at much greater
risk of wrongful eviction if forced to litigate pro se. Such indi-
viduals may also have much more at stake in an eviction pro-
ceeding because they may be less able to compete aggressively
for severely limited housing resources and, if evicted, would be
more likely to become homeless than others. An additional
variable is the elasticity of the rental housing market in the
locality. Tenants in jurisdictions with a very limited availability
of low-cost housing have much more at stake than tenants in
jurisdictions with an abundance of affordable housing. By ana-
lyzing these and other variables on a case-by-case basis, courts
432 U.S. 907 (1977). Constitutional analyses such as this one, peculiar to particular
states, may provide further bases for the recognition of a right to assigned counsel in
eviction cases.
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can begin to develop "bright-line" rules regarding appointment
of counsel.
An individualized approach may ultimately prove unwork-
able, however. One factor that prompted the Supreme Court in
Gideon to establish an across-the-board right to counsel for
criminal defendants was the complexity and unworkability of a
case-by-case approach. The inconsistency that would result
from the discretionary application of the Mathews test or other
analyses by many different judges could easily lead to confusion
and inordinate complexity. In the final analysis, the long-range
failure of an individualized approach could well result in the
emergence of an across-the-board policy.
IV. Who Should Be Appointed?
Whether it is as a due process entitlement, in the exercise
of discretion under due process or through an in forma pauperis
statute, the possibility of court appointment of counsel for low-
income tenants faced with eviction raises the inevitable issue of
who should be appointed. The options are finite. One alternative
is to solicit a volunteer attorney to provide representation. If no
volunteer can be found, or if they are so inclined, judges in
most jurisdictions may order a member of the bar to represent
the indigent defendant. If a mandatory appointment is made,
the issue is further complicated because of the need to determine
who is an appropriate attorney to appoint, what are the rights
of the designated attorney to reject such an appointment, and
whether the appointed attorney has a right to compensation.
29
For most of the last decade, a debate has raged in the legal
community over whether pro bono provision of legal assistance
by attorneys should be made a mandatory obligation for all
members of the bar. 30 If proponents of this concept are suc-
2 The issue of whether courts have the power to mandate a private attorney to
represent a client free of charge has been sharply contested in recent years. Although
the trend appears to be the recognition that courts do have that power, the debate is
far from resolved. See generally Huskey v. Tennessee, 56 U.S.L.W. 2466 (U.S. Feb.
23, 1988); United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
978 (1966). But cf. State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1985) (en bane)
(attorney cannot be forced to represent indigent client where attorney's funds would be
spent in representation and attorney's services would go uncompensated).
130 See, e.g., Graham, Mandatory Pro Bono: The Shape of Things to Come?, A.B.A.
J. 62 (Dec. 1, 1987).
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cessful, free legal assistance to indigent people will be far more
abundant and the problem of lack of counsel for tenants faced
with eviction will be somewhat ameliorated. Currently, the pros-
pects for such a development are remote, 131 as the voluntary
efforts of members of the bar have not yet significantly contrib-
uted to the availability of counsel for the poor in civil matters.
In the absence of sufficient numbers of uncompensated
counsel who can be cajoled or compelled into representing in-
digent tenants in eviction proceedings, if a right to counsel for
such tenants is established, states will be obligated to provide
compensation for appointed attorneys. Many states already
have programs for compensation of private attorneys who are
appointed as counsel in criminal matters. While such a system
could be set up to compensate appointed attorneys for repre-
sentation in eviction cases, this system may not be the most
efficient solution.
Perhaps the simplest and most efficient answer to the ques-
tion of whom to appoint would be to expand the availability of
publicly-funded legal services programs to meet the need. The
need for a judicially-recognized right to counsel exists because
free legal services programs are unable to serve the needs of
poor people for representation. At the levels at which they are
currently funded, such programs could not serve additional
clients in the event of the recognition of a right to counsel.132
Nor can attorneys in legal services programs funded through
the federal Legal Services Corporation be appointed in any
greater numbers than the remainder of the bar in general. 133
Yet, if tenants faced with eviction are entitled to appoint-
ment of counsel, a large number of defendants will need repre-
sentation.' 34 In large urban jurisdictions, representation of in-
131 Id.
1 See supra note 10.
13 "Attorneys employed by a recipient [of funding from the Legal Services Cor-
poration] shall be appointed to provide legal assistance without reasonable compensation
only when such appointment is made pursuant to a statute, rule or practice applied
generally to attorneys practicing in the court where the appointment is made." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2996e(d)(6) (1977).
134 While there would be a large number of tenants entitled to representation, the
total number of eviction proceedings would likely diminish. First, landlords would be
more likely to seek to negotiate agreements if they knew that tenants would be repre-
sented by counsel in an eviction proceeding. Second, if tenants are represented by
counsel, disputes could be resolved with greater finality and thus the need for multiple
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digent tenants should be handled by an organization which has
expertise in the area of housing law, and is equipped to com-
petently represent a large volume of cases simultaneously. Be-
cause of the investment of time that is necessary to master
landlord-tenant law, and the economy of appearing in court to
represent several individuals on the same day, it would be pref-
erable to utilize organizations that are structured to handle such
cases efficiently. Because existing programs for the delivery of
free legal assistance satisfy these criteria, these organizations
should be expanded to enable them to serve the needs of all
indigent tenants facing eviction proceedings.
Conclusion
There is much at stake for a low-income tenant faced with
eviction. On one level, the tenant faces an imminent threat of a
disrupted life and displacement from her home. On another
level, the tenant faces the possibility that she will be unable to
find any alternative housing and therefore will be rendered
homeless and subject to the devastating consequences that
homelessness engenders.
The judicial system itself makes a tenant's right to counsel
considerably more important. An unrepresented tenant will en-
counter substantial difficulties defending himself in a technical
eviction proceeding which is based on a wide variety of proce-
dural and substantive legal requirements.
In light of the risks at stake and the complexity of the legal
issues, attorney representation can mean the difference between
access to a home and homelessness. The recognition of a right
to counsel for low-income tenants faced with eviction will not,
of course, be a panacea for the housing ills of this nation. It
will, however, have a profound influence on the eviction pro-
cess. At a time when there is simply no place to go for low-
income families and individuals who lose their homes, the right
proceedings will be greatly obviated. For example, a tenant who is sued for eviction
based on nonpayment of rent may be entitled to assert a defense based on the warranty
of habitability. A represented tenant is more likely to be able to take advantage of the
court's power to enforce the warranty of habitability by asserting the appropriate
defenses and counterclaims. Resolving rent and repairs issues in the same proceeding
eliminates the need for additional, protracted proceedings.
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to counsel will maximize tenants' ability to defend their interests
and minimize the risk of unjust eviction. At a time when local,
state and federal governments are spending millions of dollars
for temporary shelter for the homeless, the recognition of such
a right will enable some who would otherwise become homeless
to stay in their homes. Most importantly, at a time of growing
consciousness of the low-income housing crisis and the long-
range consequences to the individual and society of the loss of
a home, it will be a step that affirms the fairness and integrity
of the judicial process and enables those faced with the loss of
their homes to have a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
